Operation Market Garden Day 4

The 1^st Airborne Division are forced onto the defensive after being surrounded by the Germans.

Back at Nijmegen, General Gavin, commander 82^nd Airborne, had formulated a plan to simultaneously take both ends of the road and rail bridges. The key was to avoid getting bogged down in urban fighting and to outflank the German positions via an amphibious crossing, establishing a bridgehead on the north bank. Consequently, three attacking groups were established. The West Group (comprising Company D, 505^th PIR, 82^nd Airborne Division, supported by a troop of Shermans from No. 3 Squadron,  2^nd Grenadier Guards, and an infantry platoon of 1^st Grenadier Guards) was given the task of taking the railway bridge. Whilst the larger East Group (consisting of Company E, 505^th PIR, plus the remaining three Sherman troops from No. 3 Squadron and the three infantry platoons of No. 2 Company) were given the objective of capturing the road bridge five hundred yards further to the east.

A thousand yards west of the rail bridge, Shermans from the Irish Guards, as well as the 24 Sexton self-propelled 25-pounder guns of the 153^rd Field Regiment RA and a couple of 57mm anti-tank guns, were part of the third assault force being assembled to provide fire support for the 504^th PIRs planned amphibious assault of the River Waal once the plywood and canvas assault boats from XXX Corps arrived. Twenty-six boats were available for the crossing as seven were lost in transit. The major problem was that the assault would need to take place in broad daylight and overcome the German defences. Not only that, but the paratroopers would also need to negotiate their assault boats through 150 yards of mud flats before they manhandled their 20ft, 300lb plus boats over a sandy dyke and chain link fence into the eight-knot fast-flowing Waal. Those paratroopers who survived being killed, wounded, drowned, or sunk during the crossing would then be tasked with crossing 800 yards of flat open ground before reaching the German entrenched positions, including bunkers, which were positioned on and behind a 30-foot-high dyke. Further impeding progress were the 2cm flak guns located on the brick-built Fort Beneden Lent, as well as the rail bridge, which was festooned with 34 machine guns as well as an 8.8cm Flak gun.

The assault was launched at 1500 hours, preceded by a Typhoon strafing run, a ten-minute artillery bombardment, followed by a further ten minutes of firing white phosphorus shells to create a smokescreen. 24 Irish Guards Shermans would supplement the smoke where necessary and fire HE rounds at identified enemy target. Communicating the targets identified by the paratroopers to the tanks in a timely manner was proving an issue however, which resulted in some inevitable delays. Interestingly, a post-war interview with the author Cornelius Ryan has the CO of 3^rd Battalion, the Irish Guards, Lt. Col. J.O.E. Vandeleur, asleep throughout the entire battle due to feeling unwell from a diet of apples and champagne.

Each boat could hold 16-18 paratroopers with a three-man engineer crew. Whilst the first 100 yards was relatively calm, a wind started to dissipate the smoke screen, exposing the boats to between fifteen and twenty-five minutes of concentrated automatic, mortar, and flak fire from the German positions as they crossed to the north bank. The lack of enough paddles meant that paratroopers had to use their rifle butts to maintain momentum against the strong current and stay the course over the water.

Around 200 paratroopers were killed or wounded during the crossing. The survivors in 504^th PIR moved across the open terrain to the dyke, returning fire as they went, and then proceeded to clear out the German positions in vicious close combat, with little quarter given to those wishing to surrender as they moved towards the north side of the rail bridge, which they were able to capture by 1740.

On the southside, efforts to advance through Nijmegen to the bridges were met by tough German resistance, especially through Hunnerpark, which meant that it wasn’t until around 1800 that a Grenadier Guards Troop of Shermans made an initial advance across the road bridge, which was met immediately by sustained heavy anti-tank fire from the 8.8 cm Flak gun emplaced on the bridge, forcing them to withdraw.

Thirty minutes later, Sergeant Robinson’s troop tried again, with Robinson being told by his CO Major Trotter that “You’ve got to get across at all costs… Don’t stop for anything.” This time they ascended the bridge ramp and advanced, with Robinson’s gunner knocking out the gun during a brief duel. Pushing on across the bridge, the Shermans engaged German infantry in the bridge’s supporting ironwork, as well as knocking out another anti-tank threat before they linked up with elements of Company E, 504^th PIR, their ‘feathered friends’, at the north end of the bridge by 1915. On identifying the tanks as Shermans, Captain Burris of 504^th PIR memorably declared, “You guys are the most beautiful sight I’ve seen for years!”.

The 82^nd Airborne would remain in the area protecting the Airborne Corridor for 56 days, losing 1,432 killed, wounded, and missing. Whilst 101^st Airborne protected their ‘Hell’s Highway’, they had to contend with strong German counterattacks around Vehgel on the 22^nd September, which cut the road. After 72 days of combat, the 101^st Airborne were relieved, having lost 2,118 men killed, wounded, and missing.

Whilst there is some confusion as to whether any Shermans were knocked out (potentially two), there were two German attempts to blow the bridge as the tanks were crossing. Both failed. Brigadeführer Heinz Harmel, commanding 10 SS Panzer Division Frunsberg, was shocked when the bridge didn’t blow. Engineers and paratroopers had got onto the bridge and had started cutting wires to as many charges as they could find on the girders and those leading to the bridge. Hard fighting would continue at both ends of the bridges as night drew in with the reinforcements of additional Shermans and M10 tank destroyers from the 21^st Anti-Tank Regiment deploying across the bridge to the north side whilst Nijmegen burned.

Ten miles up the road at Arnhem, there was no let-up for the beleaguered paras at the bridge, as the remaining Tiger returned around 1000. This time it positioned itself at the crossroads and started to engage the school once more, setting it on fire and forcing Captain McKay and the remaining occupants to evacuate before it collapsed. He was captured shortly after. The fighting at the bridge lasted almost four days, with the German response proving to be strong and decisive for the gallant but embattled but lightly armed British airborne forces.

For the rest of 1^st Airborne Division protecting the landing and drop zones, attempts to join Lt. Col. Frost at that bridge were proving futile as the German reinforcements started to close in from all sides. Consequently, heavy and increasingly desperate fighting would see 1^st Airborne withdraw into the Oosterbeek Pocket 20-26th, and even the reinforcement of Major General Sosabowski’s 1^st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade on the 21^st of September proved to be too little, too late.